THE WELFARE IMPACT OF SELF-REGULATION by Zago, Angelo M.
The welfare impact of self-regulation
Angelo M. Zago∗
Preliminary draft - Paper prepared for the 2002 AAEA Annual
Meeting in Long Beach - CA
Abstract
This paper is concerned with welfare eﬀects of self-regulation. It
considers one group of heterogeneous producers modelling incentives
they face when collectively deciding about production and trade of
a commodity and employing a technology that take into account the
trade-oﬀ between quality and quantity.
∗Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche — Universita’ di Verona, Via dell’Artigliere, 19
Verona 37139 Italy email:angelo.zago@univr.it – Copyright 2002 by Angelo Zago. All
rights reserved. Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial
purposes by any means, provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies.
11 Introduction
Dating from the Great Depression few interventions have survived
without reform. A notable exception is regulation of agricultural pro-
duction through marketing orders. In fruit and vegetable sectors, agri-
cultural producers and handlers have the power to regulate production
and trade of single commodities. Marketing orders also regulate mar-
kets for milk in US States. In many other parts of the world as well
producer groups are granted authority to self-regulate production and
trade of many commodities. They decide quality standards, grading
schemes, volume controls and marketing and advertising policies.1
This form of market organization is not considered a direct sup-
port to producers and as such it is allowed under the last WTO agree-
ment. However, many economic analyses are critical towards it. Even
though not explicitly permitted under the prevailing regulations, pro-
ducer groups are accused of exercising market power and reducing
consumers’ welfare (Jesse, 1979). Particularly scrutinized are policies
of output control, condemned as being used solely to increase prices
for producers (USDA, 1981; Carman and Pick, 1990).2
Some also argue that a subtler form of market power occurs through
quality regulation. By imposing stricter quality standards, producer
groups reduce output and increase prices (Chambers and Weiss, 1992).3
It is now well established that with perfect information and observable
quality there is no need for government intervention. Regulations in
the form of minimum quality standards, for example, limit consumer
1The European Union has been providing subsidies in the recent years for the establish-
ment and operations of producer organizations in fruit and vegetable industries. According
to the regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No. 2200/96, in the Oﬃcial Journal of the Eu-
ropean Communities No. L297/1 of November 21, 1996), these groups should help supply
meet demand, establish and implement quality standards, and introduce environmentally-
friendly technologies at the farm level. The presence of producer groups is relevant in
other countries too, for example coﬀee in Colombia, wine in France and Italy, and maple
syrup in Canada.
2Recently, the Italian Antitrust Authority condemned producer groups for Parmesan
cheese and Parma’s ham because they imposed individual quantity quotas on members.
3There exist the cases of quality standards in fruit and vegetable markets to exclude
the production of supposedly lower quality products. For example, wine producers using
the appellation contrˆ oll´ ee are required to produce within a yield ceiling in order to ensure
better quality of grapes and wine. These practices are defended by producers as regulations
intended to increase the quality of products, thus beneﬁtting consumers and producers
alike (see, e.g., Canali and Boccaletti, 1998).
2and producer choices and therefore cannot increase economic welfare
(Bockstael, 1984). When there exists uncertainty about quality char-
acteristics of products, however, there is justiﬁcation for intervention.
Quality standards in this latter case could improve social welfare, con-
ditional on the optimal choice of the standard itself.
The potential problem is that a collusive industry may impose too
high a standard. In addition, a more concentrated industry would
facilitate its implementation, while in a competitive industry, where
the standard would be more needed, it would have trouble emerging
spontaneously (Bockstael, 1987). Economic theory is still ambiguous
regarding the net welfare eﬀects of self-regulating groups. However,
in the policy arena these same groups are perceived as an appropriate
way to help the agricultural sector without public disbursement of
funds and hence resource misallocation (Neﬀ and Plato, 1995).
This paper is concerned with eﬀects of self-regulation in agricul-
tural markets. It considers one group of producers that voluntary
decides to regulate production and trade of a single diﬀerentiated com-
modity. It allows for heterogeneous producers considering incentives
they face when collectively deciding about production and trade of
a commodity. The paper considers the case of more than one choice
variable by employing a technology and preference sets that take into
account the trade-oﬀ between quality and quantity. With a relatively
simple model we are able to show whether there is a loss of eﬃciency
due to self-regulation. We are also able to discern whether market
structure can aﬀect results and distortions.
Our paper is related to literature on principal-agent problems with
hidden information (see, e.g., Guesnerie and Laﬀont, 1984). Although
we use two instruments, quality and quantity, we show that results are
similar in nature to those one can obtain considering one instrument.
Indeed, using a simple model with two types, we conﬁrm that one
can still apply the revelation principle and multidimensional problems
have solutions that resemble their single-dimensional counterparts,
provided the number of instruments is no greater than the number of
types (McAfee and McMillan, 1988). The problem we analyze though
is diﬀerent from the standard principal-agent model with multidimen-
sional instruments because principals and the agents in our game are
endogenous, in the sense that the principals the type of agent con-
stituting the majority of agents and depend on Nature’s draws. This
makes our paper more similar to problems of optimal taxation in pub-
lic ﬁnance.
3The next section introduces the simpliﬁed model with hidden in-
formation and two types of producers: one that is relatively eﬃcient at
producing quantity of a particular commodity, while the other is rela-
tively more eﬃcient in producing quality. Section three shows results
for the case in which the producer organization (PO) can freely im-
plement an eﬃcient remuneration mechanism and the majority in the
group is of quantity-eﬃcient producers. In the fourth section we de-
rive results when the PO is composed of a majority of quality-eﬃcient
producers, and in section ﬁve we perform a simulation to see whether
market power may increase ineﬃciencies. Section six concludes the pa-
per with limitations of the present research and suggestions for some
possible extensions.
2 The model
Consider an agricultural commodity as an experience good. A
group of farmers has to decide whether or not to form a Producer
Organization (PO) with common rules about production and trade
of products. The group is made of n heterogeneous producers, some
of whom have lower costs for their products. We assume that pro-
ducers can be of two diﬀerent types, and each type is denoted by i,
with i = V,H. For example, in wine production many practitioners in
Europe claim that vineyards in valleys and plain areas are relatively
more favored in producing large amount of grapes that give wines
of reasonable but not excellent quality. On the other hand, the soil
and weather conditions in hilly areas seem to be more favorable for
high quality wines, even though the quantity of grapes obtained may
be relatively lower. By i = V we then denote the quantity-eﬃcient
type (V stands for valleys), while by i = H we mean the producers
that are more eﬃcient at producing quality (H for hilly areas).4 For
convenience, we assume n is an odd number and nH + nV = n.
The production technology for diﬀerent producers can be repre-
4Since we are interested in the quantity-quality trade-oﬀ, we consider either producers
that are eﬃcient at producing quantity but ineﬃcient with quality production (V ) or those
that vice versa produce eﬃciently quality attributes but in a limited quantity (H). In other
words, we do not consider the case of producers eﬃcient or ineﬃcient at both quantity
and quality. This reduction of types should make the analysis simpler without losing the
main insights and should be suitable for the situations that are common in agricultural
markets.
4sented using a technology set in the following way:
Ti = {(x,q,s) : x can produce q,s |i},
where x ∈ <+ is a vector of inputs that producers choose, q ∈ <+
is the quantity of output, s ∈ <+ is the quality of the output and
i = V,H. With this representation of the technology we consider a
unique commodity and we represent it with a multi-output technology:
the ﬁrst is to be considered the usual scalar measure of the quantity
of the commodity, q, while the second, s, is an index of the quality of
the commodity produced.5 This representation is general and without
imposing assumptions and restrictions on the technology it allows to
capture the main features of the production process.
Producers’ choices can be indirectly represented with their cost
function:
ci(q,s) = minx{wx : (x,q,s) ∈ Ti},
where w is the vector of input prices. Assume type i‘s cost of pro-
duction, ci(q,s), to be twice diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing, strictly
convex in q, s and without ﬁxed costs. To simplify the analysis we use
an additively separable cost function of the type:6
ci(q,s) = cqi(q) + csi(s),
with i = V,H.7 In addition, we express the diﬀerent skills of producers
with the following.
Assumption 1 (Across Types Ranking). Producers of diﬀerent



















5For example, we may represent the output of a vineyard in terms of the amount of
grapes produced (say in tonnes per acre) and of its quality expressed with the average
sugar content (say in degrees Brix).
6In the remaining of the paper, for convenience we will use the general form ci(q,s)
unless we need to use the speﬁcic functional form cqi(q) + csi(s).
7Figure 1, for example, represents the cost planes for the two types of producers when










2 . Note that compared
to the case of one choice variable, instead of having the single-crossing property translated
into one point of intersection between the two cost curves, we have a unique manifold of
intersection between the two cost planes.
5This set of conditions, which resembles the single crossing property
and that we may call the Across Type Ranking, simply says that the
marginal cost of production of quantity q is lower for type V than for
type H, while the marginal cost of producing quality s is lower for
type H than for type V , other things being equal.
We consider risk-neutral producers whose preferences are separable
in income and eﬀort and whose proﬁts for the production of a quantity
q of quality s are: πi = y(q,s) − c(q,s), where y(q,s) is the revenue
each producer receives from the PO for the amount q of product of
quality s. In this paper, we consider only hidden information: each
producer has private information about his own type. We assume that
the PO can perfectly observe and verify the quantity and quality level
provided by each producer.
Given this assumption, the PO can ensure that the payment to
the producers should be a function of the output provided, y(q,s).
The group though can not observe each producer type. The group or
the management may have a prior on the relative number of diﬀerent
producers, and may use this information to optimally design the menu
of contracts oﬀered to members.8
The PO sells producers’ commodity on the market and the price
it receives is a function of the total quantity produced and the quality
that the consumers expect, which is the average of the quality pro-
vided by individual producers. In other words, the revenue for the
group is p(Q,S)Q, where Q is the aggregate production level for the
group, for example Q =
PH
i=V niqi, with i = V,H and where qi repre-
sents the quantity produced by type i. S = S(ni,si,qi) is the average
quality for the group: if si represents the quality of the good produced
by the producer of type i, the average quality from the n producers





with i = V,H. Note that p(Q,S), the inverse demand, represents the
willingness to pay of the consumers, and it has a general form with
pQ(·) < 0, pQQ(·) ≥ 0, pS(·) > 0 and pSS(·) ≤ 0. The aggregate
demand is downward sloping in quantity, but less than proportion-
ately, i.e., convex in quantity. It is also increasing in average quality,
but less than proportionately, i.e., concave in average quality.
The potential n members meet together to decide whether to form
8The group is prevented from using the information to explicitely discriminate among
members. In other words, the management can only oﬀer a menu of contracts from which
producers can choose, but can not decide which single contract to oﬀer to individual
members, even if it is the optimal one for that producer’s type.
6the PO and how to run it. If the PO is formed, the producers will pool
together their production under the collective brand and will receive
a price in the market according to the output (quantity and quality
level) they provide. In the present setting only one group is allowed
to form: if the producers can not agree, the group may not form and
each producer faces a competitive market where there is no means to
individually signal quality and the proﬁt level is zero.
The group is a polity and is governed with majority rule. It is
reasonable to think that among the implementable mechanisms each
producer independently votes for the one that is the best for himself.
Given the assumption about types and technology structure, it is not
possible to simply guess which will emerge. It is sensible though to
think that the menu of contracts which emerge will be optimal for
producers having the majority of the group. The remuneration mech-
anism that is then decided at the PO‘s level is the one that is voted
by the majority of the producers.
Among the contracts that are implementable, producers have to
ﬁgure out those that are feasible, i.e., those that satisfy the rationality
or participation constraint like the following:
yi − ci(qi,si) ≥ ui,
PCi (2)
which says that each producer participates on a voluntary basis and
so must receive at least her reservation utility. In addition, the PO





BC(3)p(Q,S)Q is the revenue - net of processing costs - that the PO
receives from selling the members‘ good in the market and is a func-
tion of the total quantity Q and average quality S. The aggregate
revenues from the products sold in the market minus the payments to
the producers must cover the ﬁxed costs F for the Producer Organi-
zation.
To ﬁnd the optimal contract or mechanism one has to take into
account the incentives facing diﬀerent producers. A mechanism in our
case is the combination of payments to producers and output (quan-
tity and quality) provided by producers, i.e., (yi,qi,si). Using the
7revelation principle (Myerson, 1979) we can focus on direct revelation
mechanisms, mechanisms constructed so that it is in each producer‘s
dominant strategy to tell the truth. That is to say, one can design a
contract in which producers tell the truth, i.e., it is implementable,
provided it is incentive-compatible. Hence, any payment schedule that
the producers adopt has to satisfy:
yi − ci(qi,si) ≥ yj − ci(qj,sj) (4)
where i is the true type and j is the reported type. Eq. (4) says
that when producers report (qi,si) in exchange for yi they should
be better oﬀ reporting their true type. Since we are considering two
types, we can restrict attention to a menu in which the number of
contracts is equal to two, the number of types. Indeed, there is no
need to oﬀer more contracts than agent’s types (Fudenberg and Tirole,
1991). In order to ﬁnd the optimal contract, it is useful to derive some
monotonicity in the relative activity levels for each type taking into
account the constraint in eq. (4). We can have four possible cases:
qV ≤ qH and sV ≤ sH (case i); qV ≥ qH and sV ≥ sH (case ii);
qV ≥ qH and sV ≤ sH (case iii); and qV ≤ qH and sV ≥ sH (case iv).
Given Incentive Compatibility, sH ≥ sV implies qH ≥ qV and
hence yH ≥ yV (case i)); sV ≥ sH implies that qV ≥ qH and yV ≥ yH
(case ii)). qV ≥ qH and sV ≤ sH, (case iii), is incentive-compatible
and, in addition, either yV ≥ yH (case iii/a) if ci(qV ,sV ) ≥ ci(qH,sH),
i = V,H; or yV ≤ yH (case iii/b) if ci(qV ,sV ) ≤ ci(qH,sH), i = V,H.
The last case, case iv), qV ≤ qH and sV ≥ sH, does not satisfy both
incentive-compatible constraints.
Proof: See Appendix 1.
Intuitively, each type is eﬃcient at producing one of the two activ-
ities and should produce more of it and less of the other9. But she can
also decide (or can be oﬀered) otherwise and the lemma distinguishes
between the four possibilities. When one type is oﬀered or decides to
pick the activity at which she is relatively less eﬃcient at an higher
level, she must do so also with the other activity at which she is more
eﬃcienct, and thus produce more of both. Accordingly, she would
receive an higher payment. This is the only way to have an incentive
compatible contract, and this is what would happen with cases i) and
ii).
Another possibility is for each type to pick more of the activity
at which she is more eﬃcient and less of the other. This would be
9By more we in fact mean no-less; by less, we mean no-more.
8incentive-compatible, with the relative magnitude of the payments
depending on technology conditions. When quantity is relatively more
expensive to produce, case iii/a), then the valley type producing more
of it should be paid more than the other type. The opposite is when
quality is relatively more costly, case iii/b). The last case is when
both types choose a higher level of the activity at which they are less
eﬃcient, a contract which would not be incentive-compatible.
3 The solution of the game with a quantity-
eﬃcient majority
In this section, we derive the optimal mechanism for the ﬁrst scenario,
when Nature draws nV > nH and so the majority is of quantity-
eﬃcient producers, like for example in prevalently valley areas in the
case of grapes for wine production. In this case the majority of the
votes goes to the optimal menu of contracts selected by quantity-
eﬃcient types, that is the program that has the objective of maxi-
mizing their proﬁts (πV ) and is subject to the constraints that each
producer‘s participation is on a voluntary basis, that each type should





yV − cV (qV ,sV )
o
s.t. (ICV ) yV − cV (qV ,sV ) ≥ yH − cV (qH,sH), (5)
(ICH) yH − cH(qH,sH) ≥ yV − cH(qV ,sV ),




niyi ≥ F, i = V,H.
(PO) is the maximand and represents the proﬁts of the producer that
is in the drawn majority. (ICH) and (ICV ) are the incentive compat-
ible constraints: since the management can not verify the producers’
cost of production, the PO must oﬀer a payment y based on the ob-
servable output (q and s) to induce each producer to select himself and
pick the mechanism designed for him. (PCi) are the participation or
rationality constraints of the two types. Outside opportunities are
denoted by ui. (BC) is the break-even constraint: the net aggregate
9revenues minus the payments to the producers should cover the ﬁxed
costs F.
Note that this problem is diﬀerent from the standard mechanism
design problem with two types mainly because in this setting the ob-
jective is to maximize the proﬁt of one type, notably the one in the
majority, while in the standard setting the objective function is con-
cerned with the principal’s welfare. In other words, in this problem
the principal is endogenous and coincides with one of the agents of the
standard setting. In addition, an adjunct feature in this model is the
budget constraint.10 It corresponds to a problem of optimal taxation
with a weighted utility function, and exactly to the two polar cases in
which all weight is given to one of the two types.









− cV (qV ,sV )
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, (6)
in which the management (on majority’s behalf) ﬁrst chooses the re-
muneration or payment scheme that maximizes the total payments to
type V while satisfying all the constraints, and then ﬁnds the eﬃcient
level of output (quantity and quality) to provide for each type.11 First
note that the budget constraint must be binding.
At the optimum of the ﬁrst stage, the budget constraint (BC) is
binding.
Proof: Using arguments similar to those of Weymark (1986) and
Chambers (1997), suppose that at the optimum the budget constraint
(BC) is not binding. Increase payments to both types, yV and yH,
by the same small amount. All constraints remain satisﬁed and the
objective function increases.
Now we can say more about the possible monotonicities in the
activities level. We already excluded one of the four possible cases,
case iv), because of lemma 2.1. We can now show that two other
cases, i) and ii), are not optimal.
It is never optimal for the producer organization to oﬀer menus
characterized by condition i) and ii).
Proof: See Appendix 2.
10In the standard setting there are in fact other problems that require budget balance
(see, for example, Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, ch. 7).
11With a diﬀerent timing in the game, the group could ﬁrst oﬀer a payment schedule to
members, whom would then decide the output to provide.
10In other words, the optimal menu entails specialization, i.e., hill-
side producers specialize in quality and valley producers specialize in
producing quantity.
Note that ICV is above ICH because of truth-telling and the as-
sumption (A1). In other words, the payment for the Hilly type, yH,
derived from the ICV , is no less than the yH derived from ICH (see
Appendix 3). In addition, notice that both IC constraints are either
below (case i/a), or above the bisector (case i/b). Then the ﬁrst step
of the problem can be represented like in ﬁgure 2.
Also notice that only two constraints may be simultaneously bind-
ing, one being the budget constraint. The other could be any one of
the remaining four, the PCis and ICis. But we can show that it is
not optimal to have either one of the majority’s constraints binding.
At the optimum, neither of the constraints for the majority’s type,
PCV or ICV , will be binding.
Proof. See Appendix 4.
Remember that the majority cares about her own, i.e., type V ’s,
welfare. From ﬁgure 2, notice that for a given activity level the solution
of the ﬁrst step is either at A, when the PCH intersects the BC below
A, and then the incentive compatible constraint ICH is binding; or at
the intersection between PCH and the budget constraint BC, when
the PCH intersects the BC above A but within the feasible region
between A and B, i.e., the participation constraint for the minority
PCH is binding.12 In the next section we consider the solutions of the
problem when the incentive constraint is binding, while in the section
that follows we consider the binding participation constraint case.
3.1 Binding H’s incentive-compatibility con-
straints
The ﬁrst case we consider is at point A, where the budget constraint
and the quality-eﬃcient producer’s incentive compatibility constraint,
ICH, are binding. In this case, the PO has to avoid that the quality-
eﬃcient in the minority ”poses” as a quantity-eﬃcient type. We then
have the following:
cH(qH,sH) − cH(qV ,sV ) + yV = yH,
p(Q,S)Q − F − nHyH = nV yV ,
12Another possibility would be to have no feasible solutions, which would correspond to
PCH intersecting the BC above B.







[cH(qH,sH) − cH(qV ,sV )],
yH = yV + cH(qH,sH) − cH(qV ,sV ).
As this latter equation shows, the payment for the quality-eﬃcient
type (H) in the minority makes her just indiﬀerent between her pay-
ment scheme and the one intended for the quantity-eﬃcient (V ) should
she, the quality-eﬃcient type, pose as quantity-eﬃcient.13
In the second step, the problem is the choice of the optimal quan-
tity and quality levels. By deﬁning an auxiliary variable α ≥ 0 such
that qV = qH + α and β ≥ 0 such that sH = sV + β, we take into
account the conditions of Lemma 2.1 and reduce the problem to an















niqi; S = S(ni,si,qi); qV = qH + α; sH = sV + β.
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s (sH) − csH
s (sV )] − csV
s (sV ) ≤ 0,
13Note that whether yH > yV or not depends on technology conditions, that is on












where pQ(·) and pS(·) are the ﬁrst derivatives of the inverse demand
function with respect to Q and S, while cq(·) and cs(·) are the ﬁrst
derivatives of the cost function with respect to q and s. Let us assume
that we have interior solutions for q and s. With regard to the auxiliary
variables, we can have diﬀerent possibilities.
• No bunching
Let us start with the case in which we can assume interior solutions
for both auxiliary variables,14 i.e., α > 0 and β > 0. After some
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With interior solutions, that is with separation of the diﬀerent
types for both activities, the optimal pricing mechanism requires quality-
eﬃcient types producing quantity and quality up to the point at which
their marginal cost equals the marginal price the PO receives from the
sale of the commodity. In other words, minority types are not distorted
compared to what they would be producing in a constrained ﬁrst-best
world.15 At the same time, quantity-eﬃcient types in the majority
14See Appendix 6 for a proof that we can not have bunching for both variables, that
is, conﬁrming a result originally due to Guesnerie and Seade, that there is no bunching of
types.
15We are referring to a regulating Agency who sets up a collective brand, has perfect
observability (and veriﬁability) of quality and quantity, no information on individual pro-
ducers technology, and an utilitarian social welfare function with unitary weights for each
type of producers. In other words, consumer’s welfare would not be taken into account.
This is a situation which may be relevant when exports are a high proportion of produc-
tion, or when the regulator is captured by producers. See Appendix 5 for more details on
this problem.
13produce more of the activity at which they are relatively good at, i.e.,
quantity, and less of what they are relatively ineﬃcient at, i.e., quality.
Indeed, for the choice of quantity, remembering that qV > qH and
the Assumption 1, we have that the term in the bracket is negative,
i.e., [cqH
q (qH) − cqH
q (qV )] < 0, which implies that pq(·) < cqV
q (qV )
and so the majority types overproduce quantity. For the choice of
quality, sH > sV and hence [csH
s (sH) − csH
s (sV )] > 0, which implies
that ps(·) > csV
s (sV ), i.e., the majority type under produces quality.
• Bunching over quality
Now suppose we have partial bunching over quality, that is we
assume that β = 0 such that sV = sH, but α > 0. In this case the
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Note that the term into the bracket in the third equation, [csH
s (sH)−
csH
s (sV )], is equal to zero since sV = sH. With partial bunching on
quality, the optimal menu of contracts requires the quantity-eﬃcient
types producing quality up to the point at which their marginal cost
equals the marginal revenue the PO receives from the sale of the com-
modity. In other words, majority types are still distorted with respect
to quantity, as in the previous case, but not with respect to quality.
The minority’s type, on the other hand, is not distorted with respect
to quantity, as in the previous case with no-bunching, but now she is
producing the same level of quality like the majority’s type, that is
underproducing quality.
• Bunching over quantity
Now suppose instead we assume that α = 0 such that qV = qH,
but β > 0, that is partial bunching over quantity. In this case the
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Note that the term into the bracket in the ﬁrst equation, [cqH
q (qH) −
cqH
q (qV )], is equal to zero since qV = qH. With partial bunching on
quantity, the optimal menu of contracts now requires the quantity-
eﬃcient types producing quality in an undistorted fashion, but still
underproducing, i.e., distorting, quality. The minority’s type is not
distorted with respect to quality, but she is overproducing quantity,
since her level is equal to that of the majority type, the quantity-
eﬃcient.
To summarize, when quantity-eﬃcient types have the majority,
the group proposes two contracts so that it leaves the minority types
just indiﬀerent between the two. The majority takes advantage of its
position, and leaves the minority a rent just above reservation utility,
which is the least to be still incentive compatible. With no bunching,
the majority can ”extract” most surplus from the minority when this
latter produces at the eﬃcient level, i.e., with no distortions. In order
to make the contract incentive compatible, the majority distorts its
own optimal choices, forcing itself to produce more of the activity at
which it is relatively more eﬃcient, i.e., quantity, and less of what
the minority is relatively less eﬃcient at, i.e., quality. In this fashion,
the contract of the majority becomes less appealing to the minority’s
type.
When the costs of separating between the diﬀeret types are rela-
tively high, arguably because the cost diﬀerences in producing quality
(or quantity) are small, it is better for the group to buch together
over quality (quantity), that is not to discriminate between types over
quality. Indeed, with distortions the total surplus to be split may be
lower, so it may be better for the group to have the two types bunched,
that is producing the same quantity (quality) level, determined by the
marginal condition for the the majority’s type, which corresponds to
overproducing (underproducing) for the minority’s type. At the same
time, it is better to separate over the activity at which the producers
are rather diﬀerent, i.e., quality (quantity), by making the majority’s
type underproducing (overproducing) it.
We can now state another result that shows how the group with
15a quantity eﬃcient majority produces overall more quantity and less
quality than the constrained ﬁrst-best.
When the minority’s incentive compatibility constraint is bind-
ing, the Producers’ Organization with a quantity-eﬃcient majority
overall produces a higher quantity and lower quality levels than the
constrained ﬁrst-best.
Proof: See Appendix 7.
The intuition for this result is that the type in the majority over-
produces quantity (underproduce quality) in order to make her con-
tract less appealing to the minority. This latter is not distorted with
respect to the ﬁrst best, but since her marginal beneﬁt is smaller
(greater), given the greater quantity (smaller quality) for the produc-
tion of the majority’s type, she in fact produces less quantity (more
quality). In other words, for the individual producers quantity (and
quality) is a strategic substitute with respect to the quantity (qual-
ity) produced by the other type. This is equivalent to quantity (and
quality) spreading, and given that the inverse demand function for
the group is convex in quantity (concave in quality), it results in an
overall decrease in quantity (increase in average quality).
The group produces more quantity but at a lower average quality
level, since the majority of producers is relatively ineﬃcient at pro-
viding quality. In this way they maximize their proﬁts and have the
quality-eﬃcient members still making some positive proﬁts in order to
make the remuneration scheme incentive-compatible. A policy that
could implement this optimal mechanism would pay a relatively high
price to low-quality products and would have a relatively low premium
for high-quality ones. Using from the jargon in the literature, one can
say that the group would oﬀer a menu of relatively low-powered con-
tracts for quality. This would explain those situations in which some
groups are unable to take advantage of the quality potential of their
production.16
16For example, the case of Soave, one of the most known italian white wines. It is well
known among practitioners that the wine produced by the local cooperative, one of the
biggest wine cooperative in Europe, is of relatively low quality. It is not unusual though
to listen to some members that would rather prefer the cooperative to better remunerate
higher quality grapes and sell higher quality wine. While these members are located in
quality-fortunate production areas, the majority of producers belonging to the cooperative
is located in the fertile region, where higher yields but lower quality potential is the norm.
Indeed, more often than not the cooperative has been producing an excess supply of wine
of relatively low quality, preferring to sell to retailers big volumes for low prices.
163.2 Binding V’s participation constraint
When the participation constraint for the minority (PCH) intersects
the budget constraint in the feasible region between A and B, the
relevant constraints that are binding are the budget constraint BC
and the quality-eﬃcient producer‘s participation constraint or PCH.
While in the previous section we show the case in which the manage-
ment had to avoid the minority from mimicking the majority’s type,
now the PO has to induce the quality-eﬃcient in the minority to par-
ticipate in the group. We then have the following:
cH(qH,sH) = yH + uH,
p(Q,S)Q − F − nHyH = nV yV ,
from which we obtain the following payments for the two types:
yV =
p(Q,S)Q − F − nHcH(qH,sH)
nV
,
yH = cH(qH,sH) + uH.
The payment for the quality-eﬃcient type (H) makes her just indif-
ferent between participating in the group or staying outside of the
group. In this case, since there is no incentive-compatibility problem
given that those constraints are not binding, in the second step we
do not have to take into account the monotonicities presented in the
lemma above and each type picks what is eﬃcient for her. That is to
say, the problem to maximize is the following (unconstrained) one:
max
qi,si
p(Q,S)Q − F − nHcH(qH,sH)
nV




niqi; S = S(ni,si,qi).
Assuming interior solutions for both variables and after some manip-





∂qV ]Q + p(Q,S) = cqV

















17The optimal pricing mechanism in this case requires both quality-
eﬃcient and quantity-eﬃcient types producing quantity and quality up
to the point at which their marginal cost equals the marginal revenue
the PO receives from the sale of the commodity.17 In other words,
both minority and majority types would not be distorted compared
to a hypothetical constrained ﬁrst-best, both in the choice of quantity
and quality.
To summarize, when quantity-eﬃcient producers are the majority,
the optimal menu of contract for the group may be designed to leave
the minority producers at their reservation utility. Minority produc-
ers, under these parameter conditions for demand and technology, are
not “tempted” to mimic the majority’s type. Hence activity levels,
given that there are no problems of incentive-compatibility, are not
distorted and such that the marginal cost is equal to the marginal
revenue for an additional marginal increment of quality and quantity
for each type.
3.3 Which constraint is binding
In this section we establish for what technology and demand parameter
values we can expect the rationality constraint for the minority‘s type
to intersect the budget constraint either above or below A. In addition,
we consider when there are no feasible solutions to the problem, i.e.,
the PCH cuts the BC above B (ﬁgure 2). First, suppose that each
type is producing the ﬁrst-best, i.e., the non-distorted, quantity and
quality level. Consider now an incentive-compatible payment, i.e.,
suppose that in the ﬁrst stage of the problem the constraints that
are binding are the BC and the ICH. The optimal payment for the








[cH(qH,sH) − cH(qV ,sV )],
and call it yH
A. Now consider the payment consistent with the ratio-
nality constraint of the minority type, i.e., when the minority type
17Note that the marginal revenue for the quantity choice has three components, instead
of the usual two that a ﬁrm with monopoly power would have. Indeed, since the average
quality provided by the group is a function of the quantity produced by each type, the














[cH(qH,sH)−cH(qV ,sV )] ≥ cH(qH,sH)+uH.
(13)
When this inequality is satisﬁed it is indeed feasible, actually better,
for the group to leave some rents to the minority type’s producers.
If violated, it is better for the group to drive the minority’s types to
their reservation utility. The term on the left of the inequality can be
interpreted as the size of the opportunity to be taken by the group via
the collective action - which is a function of the demand parameters
- minus the costs of doing it. These latter depend on the ﬁxed cost
component, spread among all the producers, and on the diﬀerences
between the two types. The diﬀerences are indeed important: once
weighted by the relative number of the quality-eﬃcient producers,
they enter into determining the incentive-compatible payment for the
minority‘s type (eq. ??). The term on the right of the inequality is
the payment for the minority‘s type when his rationality constraint is
binding, and is aﬀected by outside opportunities.
This inequality says that when there are enough opportunities to
be taken by the group, i.e., the surplus creation is relatively high, it
is optimal for the majority to leave some rents above the reservation
utility to the minority‘s producers. But when there are not big oppor-
tunities to be taken, the group is relatively heterogenous in terms of
cost diﬀerences and relative number of producers, or there are good
outside opportunities for the minority’s type, it is optimal for the ma-
jority to leave the minority‘s producers just at their reservation utility
in order to increase the group’s welfare. Which also translates in no
distortions in the activity levels.
Now let us consider when it is never feasible for a quantity-eﬃcient
majority to form a group in the ﬁrst place. This may happen when the
minority type’s incentive constraint is satisﬁed but the participation
constraint cuts the BC above point B in ﬁgure 2. Again, consider
ﬁrst-best activity levels. At this point, the payment schedule makes
the majority producers, the quality-eﬃcient type, indiﬀerent between
her contract and the one designed for the minority type. that is, yV −
cV (qV ,sV ) = yH −cV (qH,sH), with the ﬁrst-best output levels. From
the budget constraint we have that yV =
p(Q,S)Q−F−nH yH
nV , which can








[cV (qH,sH) − cV (qV ,sV )].
19Call this yH
B. Now consider the payment for the quality-eﬃcient
type corresponding to the same output level but when the rational-
ity constraint is binding. The minority type‘s producers get yH =








[cV (qH,sH)−cV (qV ,sV )] ≥ cH(qH,sH)+uH.
(14)
When this inequality is satisﬁed the group may form, otherwise it
can not. Note that yH
B and yH
A diﬀer only in their cost term inside
the brackets, which is bigger (in absolute value) for yH
B. because of
truth-telling (see appendix 3). This leads us to consider the following
cases.
- Case a: yH
B > yH
A > cH(qH,sH) + uH. For these demand and
technology parameter values, the most favorable for the group, the
group may form and the minority receives some rents.
- Case b: yH
B > cH(qH,sH) + uH ≥ yH
A. In this case the group
still forms but it does not leave rents to the minority‘s types.
- Case c: cH(qH,sH) + uH ≥ yH
B > yH
A. Given these parameter
values, the opportunity to be taken via the collective action is too
small, the producers are too heterogenous, the ﬁxed costs too high, or
the outside opportunities too high for the group to form.
Appendix 1. Proof of Lemma 2.1.
Consider the incentive compatibility constraints for both types:
yV − cqV (qV ) − csV (sV ) ≥ yH − cqV (qH) − csV (sH), (15)
yH − cqH(qH) − csH(sH) ≥ yV − cqH(qV ) − csH(sV ).
Combining the two expressions we have the following:
cqH(qV )−cqH(qH)+csH(sV )−csH(sH) ≥ yV −yH ≥ cqV (qV )−cqV (qH)+csV (sV )−csV (sH).





q (q) − cqV




s (s) − csH
s (s)]ds, (16)
where cqi
q (q) and csi
s (s), i = V,H, represent the derivatives of the cost
function with respect to q and s.
20Suppose that the left-hand side (LHS) of the inequality is non-
positive, i.e., qV ≤ qH. Then to be incentive-compatible it must be
that the right-hand side (RHS) is non-positive too, i.e., sV ≤ sH and
thus yH ≥ yV (case i)).
Analogously, suppose the RHS is non-negative, that is sV ≥ sH:
to ensure incentive-compatibility the LHS must be non-negative, i.e.,
qV ≥ qH and thus yH ≤ yV (case ii)).
Consider case i), with qV ≥ qH and sH ≤ sV . The LHS is non-
negative, and the RHS is non-positive, and thus the inequality is sat-
isﬁed. Now consider the payments. Let yV ≥ yH. From ICV we
obtain
cV (qV ,sV ) ≥ cV (qH,sH),









i.e., for type V the relative cost increase over the relevant quantity
range is greater than the cost increase over the quality range. Analo-
gously, from ICH we obtain










i.e., also for type H the relative cost increase over the relevant quantity
range is greater than the cost increase over the quality range. So
when quantity is relatively more costly to produce for both types, the
payment for the type producing more of it has to be no lower, i.e.,
yV ≥ yH (case iii/a). In a similar fashion one can derive that when
quality is relatively more costly, i.e., ci(qH,sH) ≥ ci(qV ,sV ), i = V,H,
then yH ≥ yV (case iii/b).
To conclude, suppose that case (iv) holds, and qV ≤ qH and
sV ≥ sH. Given Assumption 1, the left-hand side of (16) is non-
positive and the right-hand side non-negative and thus it is not incen-
tive compatible.
Appendix 2. The optimal menu.
21Suppose that the optimal menu of contracts is characterized by
case ii), with qV ≥ qH and sV ≥ sH and call it the old menu. We
want to show that it is possible to construct a new menu that increases
the objective function with all the constraints still satisﬁed. Let us
then consider a new menu e qV = qV , e qH = qH, e sV = sH and e sH = sV ,
i.e., the hillside type now produces the quality level that was intended
for valley producers in the old menu and the valley type produces the
hillside quality level.
With the new menu, costs for the hilly type are no lower than
before, i.e., cH(qH,sH) ≤ cH(e qH, e sH), since e sH ≥ sH. For the valley
type, costs are no higher with the new menu: cV (qV ,sV ) ≥ cV (e qV , e sV ),
since e sV ≤ sV .
Now deﬁne the cost change over the quality range for both types,
∆cV (s) = csV (sV )−csV (e sV ) and ∆cH(s) = csH(e sH)−csH(sH) so that
they are both non-negative. Note that because of Assumption 1, i.e.,
csV
s > csH
s , the following is true:
∆cV (s) ≥ ∆cH(s),
that is to say, in absolute terms the cost increase over the quality range
for the hillside type is lower than the cost decrease for the valley type.
With the new menu, suppose you oﬀer a payment such that e yH =
yH + ∆cH(s) and e yV = yV − ∆cH(s), i.e., increase the payment for
hillside types and decreases payments for valley types for the same
amount, equal to the hilly type’s cost increase. It is easy to show that
with the new menu all constraints are satisﬁed. For example, suppose
that the PCH is satisﬁed with the old menu, i.e., yH − cH(qH,sH) ≥
uH. With the new menu e yH, e qH, e sH, the left-hand side of the PCH
becomes: e yH −cH(e qH, e sH), which becomes yH +csH(e sH)−csH(sH)−
cqH(e qH) − csH(e sH), since e yH = yH + ∆cH(s) and by the deﬁnition of
∆cH(s). After simplifying, we get yH − csH(sH) − cqH(e qH), and the
PCH is still satisﬁed since qH = e qH. In a similar fashion, one can
show that the other participation constraint, PCV , anf both ICis, are
satisﬁed with the new menu.
In addition, the objective function with the new menu increases,i.e.,
e πV = e yH −cH(e qH, e sH) ≥ yV −cV (qV ,sV ) = πV . Indeed, note that the
previous expression is equal to e πV − πV = yV − csH(e sH) + csH(sH) −
cqV (e qV ) − csV (e sV ) − yV + cV (qV ) + cV (sV ), which after some sim-
pliﬁcation reduces to ∆cV (s) − ∆cH(s) which is non-negative since
∆cV (s) ≥ ∆cH(s) because of Assumption 1. To conclude, with the
22new menu the proﬁts for the majority’s type would increase and hence
the contract consistent with case ii) is not optimal.
The proof for case i), i.e., qH ≥ qV and sH ≥ sV , is similar.
Consider the new menu e qV = qH, e qH = qV , e sV = sV and e sH = sH,
i.e., the hillside type produces the quantity level that was intended
for valley producers in the old menu and the valley type produces the
hillside quantity level. With the new menu, the costs for the hilly type
are no higher than before, i.e., cH(qH,sH) ≥ cH(e qH, e sH), since e qH ≤
qH. For the valley type costs are no lower: cV (qV ,sV ) ≤ cV (e qV , e sV ),
since e qV ≥ qV .
Now let us deﬁne the cost change over the quantity range as
∆cV (q) = cqV (e qV )−cqV (qV ) and ∆cH(q) = cqH(qH)−cqH(e qH), which




∆cV (q) ≤ ∆cH(q),
or, in absolute terms the cost decrease for the hillside type is higher
than the cost increase for the valley type.
Now, let us oﬀer a payment scheme such that e yH = yH − ∆cH(q)
and e yV = yV + ∆cH(q), i.e., it decreases the payment for hillside
types and increases payments for valley types for the same amount
equal to the hilliside type cost decrease, ∆cH(q). One can easily show
that both incentive-compatible constraints are satisﬁed because the
decrease in payment is just compensated by the cost decrease for the
hillside type, and the payment increase (∆cH(q)) more than compen-
sate the cost increase for the valley type. This is also true for both
types’ participation constraint. In addition, the objective function,
i.e., type V proﬁts, increases because the decrease in costs more than
compensate the increase in payment. To conclude, this shows that
also the contract consistent with case i) is not optimal.
Appendix 3. On the relative position of the incentive
compatible constraints.
From eq. (4) note the following:
yH = yV + cV (qH,sH) − cV (qV ,sV ) from ICV ,
yH = yV + cH(qH,sH) − cH(qV ,sV ) from ICH.
Now let cV (qH,sH)−cV (qV ,sV ) = A and cH(qH,sH)−cH(qV ,sV ) =
B. In case iii) we have that A ≥ B because of assumption (A1). That
is to say, the ICV lies above the ICH. Indeed, rearranging terms and
23using the fundamental theorem of calculus, we get back to inequality
(16) in Appendix 1. Intuitively, we compare the total costs of picking
the eﬃcient levels of activities of each type to its costs of producing
at the levels that would be eﬃcient for the other type. In addition,
if ci(qV ,sV ) ≥ ci(qH,sH), i = V,H, and hence yV ≥ yH (case iii/a),
then both ICV and ICH are below the bisector (ﬁgure 2a). Otherwise,
if ci(qH,sH) ≥ ci(qV ,sV ), i = V,H, and yH ≥ yV (case iii/b), then
both ICV and ICH are above the bisector (ﬁgure 2b).
Appendix 4. Not binding constraints for the majority’s
type.
Since the BC is binding, the payment of the majority’s type is the
following:
yV =
p(Q,S)Q − F − nHyH
n
,
and hence the objective function for the group becomes the following:
πV =
p(Q,S)Q − F − nHyH
n
− cV (qV ,sV ).
a) Suppose that PCV is binding, i.e., yV = cV (qV ,sV ) + uV . One
could increase yV and reduce yH by the same small amount. The
other constraints would still be satisﬁed and the objective function,
πV , would increase. Hence it is not optimal to have a binding PCV .
b) Suppose now that ICV is binding, i.e., yV −cV (qV ,sV ) = yH −
cV (qH,sH). In the same fashion, one could increase yV and reduce yH
by the same small amount. The other constraints would still be ﬁne,
while the objective function would increase. Hence it is not optimal
to have a binding ICV .
Appendix 5. The regulator’s problem (constrained ﬁrst-
best).
In this section we ﬁnd the solution of the same output provision
problem faced by a regulator, for example the case of an Agency who
sets up a collective brand, has perfect observability (and veriﬁability)
of quality and quantity, no information on individual producers’ tech-
nology, and an utilitarian social welfare function with unitary weights
for producers. In this case the program for the optimal design of a







24s.t. (ICV ) yV − cV (qV ,sV ) ≥ yH − cV (qH,sH),
(ICH) yH − cH(qH,sH) ≥ yV − cH(qV ,sV ),




niyi ≥ F, i = V,H.
The regulator would like to maximize producers’ proﬁts, given her
informational constraints (ICi) and the voluntary participation of in-
dividual producers (PCi), through market rules that do not require
public money but that would be self-ﬁnanced by producers (BC). This
















As already said, we assume that the program aims at enhancing agri-
cultural income without discriminating between diﬀerent producers.
We may then reasonably argue that neither of the ICi constraints
need to hold. In addition, let us assume that demand and technology
conditions allow to create enough surplus through the collective brand
program and hence we may argue that the PCV is to the left of B (ﬁg.
2), and PCH is below point A, i.e., both participation constraints are
not binding. Given these assumptions, there exists inﬁnite solutions
to the ﬁrst step of the problem, i.e., there are many surplus distri-
bution possibilities, and all must be on the budget constraint in the
feasible region between points A and B. The solution of the ﬁrst step
can then be derived from the budget constraint equation and is equal
to
PH
i=V ni yi = p(Q,S)Q − F. The second step of the maximization














∂qH ]Q + p(Q,S)nH − nH cqH




∂qV ]Q + p(Q,S)nV − nV cqV
q (qV ) ≤ 0,
qV ≥ 0,
25where pQ(·) and ci
q(·) are the ﬁrst derivatives with respect to Q and
q. For sV and sH the ﬁrst order conditions are the following:
pS(Q,S)Q
∂S
∂sV − nV csV




∂sH − nH csH
s (sH) ≤ 0,
sH ≥ 0,
where pS(·) and cs(·) are the ﬁrst derivatives with respect to S and s.
After some manipulations and assuming interior solutions for both
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In the case of a regulator with no redistribution concerns and when
demand and technology conditions allow the creation of enough sur-
plus through the program, the optimal mechanism requires both types
to produce quantity and quality up to the point at which the marginal
cost equals the marginal revenue received from the sale of the com-
modity under the common program.
Appendix 6. The no-total bunching proof.
To show that there is no bunching for both activities simultane-
ously we use a proof by contradiction following Chambers (1997). Let
us start from the ﬁrst order conditions of the problem of eq. (7), and
use the fact that nV
n + nH
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s (sH) − csH
s (sV )] − csV











where pQ(·) and pS(·) are the ﬁrst derivatives of the inverse demand
function with respect to Q and S, while cqi
q (·) and csi
s (·) are the ﬁrst
derivative of the cost function with respect to q and s.
To have total bunching means that we have α = 0, i.e., qV = qH =




















Note that the term on the right hand side of the inequality is < 0, be-
cause of the Across Types Ranking assumption, which implies that also













Adding the inequality derived from the ﬁrst order conditions for
α to the ﬁrst order conditions for qH reported above, and remembering










0. Thus we get the two following inequalities:





q (q) > 0, (18)





q (q) < 0.






27If we now add this inequality to the ﬁrst order conditions for sV and

















Eqs. (18) and (19) are in contradiction since cqH
q (q) > cqV
q (q) and
csV
s (s) > csH
s (s) because of the Across Types Ranking assumption.
Appendix 7. Proof of proposition 3.4.
The proof is in two steps, ﬁrst showing the spreading for individual
producers and then the aggregate result. It is in part based on a proof
suggested by Chambers (1997). Respectively from the ﬁrst and second


















which represent the slope of the curves H and V drawn in ﬁg. 3, and
which are straight lines only for exposition convenience.
Note that the intersection between the two curves is above the
bisector because of the lemma (2.1). They are downward sloping be-
cause the quantity produced by each type is a strategic substitute
for the quantity produced by the other type. Curve H cuts curve V
from above. In addition, the curves cross only once because of the
single-crossing property.
The points lying on the curves satisfy the conditions of the con-
strained ﬁrst-best, and at the point denoted by the coordinates q∗V
and q∗H, where the two curves cross, these conditions are satisﬁed
simultaneously. On the points below the curves, the marginal rev-
enue in greater than the marginal cost, while on the points above
the curves the marginal cost is higher than the marginal revenue.
To be consistent with the terms involving the choice of quantity q
in eq.(??), a solution must be on curve H but above curve V since
∂p(Q,S)Q
∂qV < cV
q (qV ,sV ), with the ﬁrst term of the inequality being
28the marginal revenue, like for example point A. It is easily seen that
a quantity combination for the two producer types consistent with
eq. (??) would then imply the quantity-eﬃcient type V to produce
more quantity, i.e., qV > q∗V and the quality-eﬃcient type to pro-
duce less quantity than the ﬁrst-best qH < q∗H. Using Lemma 1, we
can infer that eq. (??) implies a spreading of quantity provision, i.e.,
qV > q∗V > q∗H > qH.
The quantity spreading, together with eq. (??) and the convexity







∂qH , where Q∗ =
PH




∂qH . Since the price function is strictly convex in
quantity, we can infer that Q =
PH
i=V niqi > Q∗ =
PH
i=V niq∗i or that
the aggregate quantity provided by the group, when the majority is of
quantity-eﬃcient producers, is higher than the constrained ﬁrst-best.
We can prove that the average quality is lower in an analogous
fashion. In ﬁgure 3, label the vertical axis with sH, the horizontal with
sV and switch label between the two curves H and V . To be consistent
with the terms involving the choice of s in eq.(??), a solution must be
again on curve H but now below curve V , since
∂p(Q,S)Q
∂sV > cV
s (qV ,sV ),
like for example point B. In this case, a quality combination for the
two types consistent with eq. (??) implies the quality-eﬃcient type
H to produce more quality, i.e., sH > s∗H and the quantity-eﬃcient
type to produce less quality than the ﬁrst-best sV < s∗V , i.e., we can
infer that eq. (??) implies a spreading of quality provision such that
sH > s∗H > s∗V > sV .
Taken together with the quality spreading, eq. (??) and the con-











∂sH . Since the price function is strictly concave in
quality, we can infer that S∗ = S(ni,qi,s∗i) > S = S(ni,qi,si) or that
the average quality provided by the group, when the majority is of
quantity-eﬃcient producers, is lower than the constrained ﬁrst-best.
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